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‘We represent, here, the interests of the free 
world’: Accountability in Israeli leaders’ 
media talk on the Gaza Crisis 1(2008-2009) 
 
Rahul Sambaraju (Queen Margaret University, UK) 
Steve Kirkwood (The University of Edinburgh, UK) 
 
 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has attracted attention from academics 
and the wider public for the best part of the last six decades. Much of 
the debate has centred on issues of accountability for the start and 
continuation of the conflict. In particular issues such as Israeli military 
actions in the region and the outcomes of those actions which led to 
the formation of armed resistance groups against Israel, for instance 
Hamas (Milton-Edwards & Farrell 2010) have been much debated. 
Scholars, historians and journalists continue to argue over issues of 
Israeli occupation of Palestine, violence from within Palestine and 
Israel’s aggression against Palestine. However, in this paper we focus on 
social psychological aspects of the conflict, such as those of 
accountability (Buttny 1993). In particular, we focus on the Gaza crisis 
that spanned a period from the 27th of December 2008 to the 22nd of 
January 2009 (Gaza crisis: key maps and timeline 2009), between Israel 
and Hamas in Gaza Strip, resulting in a substantial loss of life and a 
continual economic blockade of Gaza Strip. We focus on the media 
news interviews with Israeli political leaders conducted during and soon 
after the Gaza crisis. The media apart from providing coverage of the 
war are also seen to engage various political actors in debates and 
                                                 
1 Gaza crisis: We have chosen to use this particular formulation of the events in Gaza 
during 27th December 2008 to 22nd January 2009 as this was used not only by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation but also by a variety of other media agents. 
Although, we have our own particular political stance towards these events we do not 
think this is an appropriate place to discuss or present those views. 
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interviews on the conflict. Our aim here is to provide a discursive 
analysis of how Israeli political leaders talk about the Gaza crisis and 
Israel’s role in the conflict. 
 
Discourse analysis and accountability 
Discourse analysis within social psychology is a methodology that 
focuses on the study of language, as members’ practice, in its own right 
(McKinlay & McVittie, 2008). Social behaviour on this approach is 
better studied via a detailed analysis of members’ discourse. Research 
within such tradition has shown that members routinely treat 
themselves and others as accountable for their actions (Buttny 1993). 
Such issues become relevant especially in cases of conflicts between 
nations as these conflicts have direct consequences for the populations 
of those nations. Routinely, political actors seem to be at the forefront 
of both being held accountable and providing accounts for their 
nations’ involvement in such conflicts. For example, in justifying the 
war on Iraq, descriptions of Saddam Hussein were seen to be made, by 
the then President Bush, in ways to make the invasion seem warranted 
(Chang & Mehan 2008).  
Members then are seen to make use of specific descriptions of 
actors and events in ways to warrant for the actions carried out against 
‘the others’. In certain instances, ‘the other’ is constructed to be distinct 
from ‘the self’ and this distinction then is employed in justifying acts 
against them. Collet (2009) shows that President Bush in his speeches 
constructs the actions of ‘the other’ as uncivilized, irrational and ‘evil’, 
which are then used to justify an armed attack on those members. 
Alternatively, members are also seen to present ‘the other’ as similar to 
another commonly known agent of terror. Erjavec and Volčič (2007) 
have shown that Serbian elites employ constructions of minority 
Muslims as similar to fundamental terrorists and hence essentially evil to 
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justify acts of aggression against them. Accountability for acts of 
aggression is also seen to be made via providing flexible narratives of 
events. For example, McKenzie (2001) has shown that members of 
British and American political elites selectively used actions of Iraq on 
Kuwait as the start of their narrative in accounting for their role in the 
Gulf War. Doing this then presents Iraq as the culpable party in the 
conflict, managing their own accountability for the war. Another way 
that members are seen to attend to issues of accountability is via 
presenting their actions as being in the interests of the wider public 
{Kirkwood, 2005 371 /id} or in the service of their national interests 
(Reicher & Hopkins 2001). 
 
Discursive approach to the Palestine-Israeli conflict 
Discursive research on the Palestine-Israeli conflict has shown 
that, although political scientists, historians and journalists may provide 
versions that attribute the conflict to either of the parties or parties 
external to the conflict, matters are not treated with such simplicity by 
Israelis or Palestinians. For example, Kuzar (2008) argues that terms 
such as ‘the right to return’ which might be taken to imply a consistent 
meaning across social and political spectrums are constructed, 
challenged and managed in a variety of ways for differing outcomes on 
the nature of the conflict. More recently it has been shown that Hamas 
leaders in media interviews manage issues of responsibility for the 
conflict not only through representations of Israel and Palestine but also 
of parties outwith the conflict such as ‘the international community’ 
(McKinlay, McVittie, & Sambaraju 2010). In making references to such 
parties, members are seen to align themselves with those parties to 
both, display a wider support for their actions and manage their own 
role in the conflict. 
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What the above research shows, then, is that members across a 
variety of contexts treat themselves and others as accountable for a 
variety of actions and that this accountability is managed in a variety of 
ways. However, it has not always been the case that research has 
pointed to the ways in which these acts are made accountable within 
the interaction. In this paper, we attempt to show the ways in which in 
media news interviews, Israeli leaders are made accountable for the 
actions of Israel in the Gaza crisis that lasted from December 2008 to 
January 2009, and the ways in which they manage such accountability. 
 
Method 
 
Data 
Data for this paper are transcripts of media news interviews conducted 
in English with Israeli political elites during the 2008-09 Gaza crisis 
(Gaza crisis: key maps and timeline 2009). These transcripts were 
collected using the News Archival Search Engine provided by Google 
by the use of terms: ‘Israel’, ‘minister’, ‘interview’ and ‘transcript’, and 
was restricted to the time period of the 2008-09 Gaza crisis. The search 
yielded a total of 60 items; duplicates, incomplete transcripts or 
transcripts in other languages were excluded. The transcripts used as 
data are transcriptions of interviews made by the respective news 
agencies and hence are likely to have been exposed to editorial 
processes and undergone changes for various reasons (see Ashmore, 
MacMillan, & Brown 2004). The transcripts retained were of 
interviews conducted with the then representatives of the Israeli 
government. These transcripts were thoroughly re-read and finally for 
the present paper we focused on three transcripts out of which the 
following extracts have been selected for further ‘fine-grained’ analysis. 
 
eSharp                                        Issue 15: Uniting Nations: Risks and Opportunities 
 
137 
 
Analysis 
The three transcripts selected included discussions on the Gaza War and 
the extracts selected included discussions on Israel’s role in the crisis, 
the relationship between Palestine and Israel, and the like. These were 
analysed using discourse analysis as outlined by McKinlay and McVittie 
(2008), which treats discourse as a topic of study on its own right.. The 
analysis here is also informed by analytic techniques of conversation 
analysis (Have 2007; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974) and studies in 
interaction (Goffman 1976; Goffman 1981) which argue for a need to 
examine talk in its sequential organization to appreciate the various 
sorts of local interactional actions that get done in talk (Potter & 
Edwards 2001; Schegloff 2007). 
As is readily seen, the present talk occurs in the context of media 
news interviews, which previous authors (Clayman & Heritage 2002; 
Hutchby 2006) have examined in detail and shown to have specific 
institutional features. These extracts were transcribed in the level of 
words and the analysis, here, proceeded via a focus on the turn-by-turn 
organization of interviewers’ and interviewees’ talk. The present study, 
then, focuses on how various parties are held accountable for the 
current Gaza conflict, how Israeli leaders negotiate and manage their 
actions against Palestine and Hamas and how offers of peace are made 
in these media interviews. 
 
Analysis 
The extract reproduced below is from an interview with the Israeli 
Foreign Minister Tzipora Livni conducted by Maggie Rodriguez, in 
Jerusalem, for CBS news on 28th December 2008, during the Gaza war 
between Israel and Hamas.  
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Extract 1 (CBS: Livni): 
1 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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26 
27 
28 
29 
Rodriguez 
 
 
 
 
 
Livni 
We just heard you say that your objective here is to 
force Hamas to stop its rocket barrages, and to limit 
its military build up. But the extent -- the intensity 
of your retaliation has been widely condemned, not 
only in the Arab world, but across Europe. Are you 
afraid this could be counter-productive? 
This is not retaliation. We are trying to change 
realities on the ground, and the realities were -- 
until this operation -- that Israeli citizens were under 
daily attacks from Gaza Strip, a place that we left.  
We drew -- took our forces out. We dismantled 
settlements in order to create a vision of peace. And 
Hamas took Gaza Strip with all its citizens and 
abused this in order to target Israel. Now, about 
your question -- about the Arab world and so -- it is 
important to understand that the world and 
description is being divided between extremists and 
moderates.  
And Israel stands together with other powers of the 
Arab and Muslim world together against extremism, 
which is being represented by Hamas, by Iran, by 
Hezbollah. They’re not fighting for any legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians, so they are just trying to 
deprive us from our rights.  
So, in a way, I think that we need to understand that 
sometimes there are some messages that leaders 
maybe need to say when they see these pictures on 
television, especially, in the Arab streets. But at the 
end of the day, I believe that we represent, here, the 
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30 
31 
interests of the free world and the interests of all 
these moderates in the region. 
Rodriguez’s question, at lines 1 to 6, while displaying features of 
‘doing’ media news interview questioning (see Heritage & Clayman 
2010 chapter 16, p.227-244) also shows three features of interest. Firstly 
at lines 1 to 3, Rodriguez is seen to report Livni’s speech – indexed by 
‘we just heard you’, – to present one particular version of the current 
states of affairs (Buttny 1998). These include, describing Israel’s actions 
and intentions as directed against what are described as military actions 
– ‘rocket barrages’ and ‘military build up’ – on the part of Hamas. 
Secondly, it presents Rodriguez as the mere ‘animator’ [one who is 
uttering those words] in presenting such states of affairs and Livni as the 
‘author’ [one who has composed the content and the message] of that 
presentation (Goffman 1981). Thirdly, by attributing such intention to 
Livni, via the use of –‘your objective here’ at line 1 – Rodriguez 
presents Livni or Israel as the ‘principal’ (Goffman 1981) [the party 
whose point of view is expressed] of those representations as well. The 
outcome then is to provide for Rodriguez a ‘neutralistic’ footing (see 
Clayman 1992) via transferring the role of ‘author’ and ‘principal’ to 
Livni. This foregrounding then opens up a ‘slot’ for her to move on to 
one particular aspect of this conflict, namely the responses to Israel’s 
actions against Hamas. It is the extent of Israel’s armed actions that are 
portrayed as being reacted to in highly negative ways by parties external 
to the conflict. This attribution of negative evaluation to parties – ‘not 
only the Arab world, but across Europe’ – is made in ways to suggest 
that such reaction from ‘the Arab world’ might be treated as a potential 
display of stake (Potter 1996). The use of ‘Europe’ as another party that 
voices similar negative reactions ‘the Arab world’ can be heard as citing 
a genuine authority, readily recognizable as such by the audience of 
CBS News and Livni herself. This both presents those actions as having 
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a problematic status and deals with potential denials of those reactions 
as mere displays of vested interest. It is this problematic status that 
Rodriguez makes relevant in her questioning at lines 5 to 6. The 
questioning is done in ways to ascribe to Livni the position of the 
‘principal’ – ‘are you afraid’ – for Israel’s actions against Hamas in Gaza. 
Rodriguez, via reporting Livni’s speech and citing other parties’ 
reactions to Israel’s actions is seen to make Livni accountable for Israel’s 
actions against Hamas. Accountability then is seen to be produced from 
within the interaction rather than it being an ever present element in 
the social world. 
Livni in her response, at line 7, is seen to produce a denial of 
Rodriguez’s formulation of Israel’s actions as constituting ‘retaliation’ 
and reformulate those actions as an attempt to ‘change the realities on 
the ground’. The denial together with the reformulation then allows 
Livni to produce an elaborate account of the nature of Israel’s actions 
against Hamas and the reasons for it, at lines 8 to 14. This account, 
presented as a narrative, firstly is indexed as ‘the realities’ and secondly, 
that the states of affairs presented here were temporally antecedent to 
the current armed conflict. By doing such presentation, Livni is seen to 
render these descriptions as factual and as having a bearing on Israel’s 
current actions. The account then is started, at lines 8 to 10, with a 
description of acts – ‘daily attacks’ – that were carried out against 
‘Israeli citizens’. Moreover, the origin of such attacks is given in terms 
of the geographical location – ‘Gaza Strip’ – and Israel’s relationship 
with that location – ‘a place that we left’. These descriptions present 
Israel and its citizens as victims of repeated acts of aggression and serve 
to distance Israel from any sort of relationship with the origin of those 
attacks. Livni goes on to list Israel’s previous actions in Gaza Strip – 
‘took our forces out’ and ‘dismantled settlements’ – alongside providing 
the intentions behind such actions, namely ‘to create a vision of peace’. 
eSharp                                        Issue 15: Uniting Nations: Risks and Opportunities 
 
141 
 
This listing is followed by descriptions of Hamas’ actions which are 
presented as temporally succeeding Israel’s actions. At lines 12 to 14, 
Hamas’ actions and intentions are presented in hearably negative ways 
via descriptions such as ‘took Gaza Strip’, ‘abused’ and ‘to target Israel’. 
These descriptions, present Israel’s actions as withdrawal of occupation 
of Gaza Strip and Hamas’ actions as acts of occupation of Gaza Strip to 
engage in aggressive acts against Israel. By the use of such descriptions 
and indicating the temporal succession (McKenzie 2001) of Hamas’ 
actions, Livni can be seen to ascribe responsibility for the current 
conflict to Hamas. 
Livni, by the use of – ‘now about your question’ at lines 14 to 15 
– not only makes a topic shift, but also treats the preceding utterances 
to have answered other parts of the question. At lines 15 to 18, Livni 
goes onto provide a meta-discursive commentary, on the presentation 
of states of affairs by unmentioned parties, which is said to involve 
practices of categorizing ‘the world’ and ‘description’ into ‘extremists’ 
and ‘moderates’. Through such commentary Livni introduces this 
category pair as members’ practices grounded in commonsensical 
notions rather than as her own representation of states of affairs. This 
allows Livni, at lines 19 to 22, to use these categories in presenting 
Israel along with ‘those in Arab and Muslim world’ as moderates and 
Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah as extremists. Three features of interest can 
be seen in doing such categorization. Firstly, the category labels used 
here – ‘other powers of the Arab and Muslim world’ and ‘Hamas’, 
‘Iran’, and ‘Hezbollah’ – are distinct in that the former is hearably 
vague and broad, and the latter is particular. One outcome of such 
description then is to ‘particularize’ (Billig 1996) these parties 
categorized as ‘extremists’ and thus presents them as hearably distinct 
from the general population of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Secondly, 
categorizing Hamas along with Iran and Hezbollah as extremists, serves 
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to exclude them from the ‘Arab and Muslim world’. Thirdly, doing 
such category ascriptions, not only serves to portray Israel in positive 
terms and Hamas in negative terms, but more interestingly to align the 
interests of Israel along with those in the ‘Arab and Muslim world’ in 
acting against ‘extremism’. Furthermore, Livni at lines 22 to 24 ascribes 
particular motivations to those described as ‘extremists’ in ways to 
negate any possible claims of legitimacy on their part and present them 
as agents engaged in activities targeted against Israel. Taken together, 
the categorization and undercutting of potential claims serve to present 
Hamas and their actions as illegitimate and as constituting aggression 
against Israel. This presentation then allows Livni to move onto 
addressing the issues of outcomes of Israel’s current actions against 
Hamas at lines 25 to 28. Here, Livni is seen to produce a vague 
description that both serves to attribute perceptions of Israel’s actions to 
misrepresentation in media and suggest that such misrepresentation 
needs to be addressed. By such description Livni is seen to transfer the 
need for accountability, produced in Rodriguez’s question, onto the 
media and parties outside Israel. Doing this allows her to make a 
summary statement, at lines 28 to 31, on Israel’s actions and intentions, 
which presents Israel as an agent of freedom and moderation.  
In this extract, Rodriguez produces her question in ways to 
accomplish ‘making’ Livni accountable for Israel’s actions against 
Hamas. Livni in her response is seen to produce alternative versions of 
the very resources that Rodriguez refers to – actions of Hamas and 
Israel, and the relationships between Israel and the Arab world – in 
ways to present Hamas as the aggressor and responsible for the current 
conflict. Additionally, Livni is seen to present Israel as acting in the 
interests of peace and moderation in the region which while ‘doing’ 
positive self-presentation also serves to argue for continuing Israel’s 
current military actions against Hamas. 
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Extract 2 (MSNBC: Livni)  
The following extract is from an interview conducted for the 
television programme ‘Meet the Press with David Gregory’ on 
December 28th 2008, by David Gregory, with Israeli Foreign Minister 
Tzipora Livni for MSNBC.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Gregory 
 
 
Livni 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Livni 
 
 
 
Gregory 
 
Livni 
What is Israel’s goal right now? Is it to re-establish 
the cease-fire, or is it to invade Gaza and remove 
Hamas from power? 
Our goal is not to reoccupy Gaza Strip. We left 
Gaza Strip. We took off for the south. We 
dismantled all the settlements. But since Gaza Strip 
has been controlled by the extremists and since 
Gaza Strip has been controlled by Hamas and since 
Hamas is using Gaza Strip in order to target us, we 
need to give an answer to this. 
Foreign Minister, aren’t you making the case for 
pushing Hamas from power? The cease-fire, 
according to Israel, simply hasn’t worked. It hasn’t 
stopped the bombing of Sderot and Israel in the 
southern areas. So only the replacement of Hamas 
by Fatah, by more moderate leaders, appears to be 
the only answer. 
The goal is to give an answer to our citizens, to 
give them the possibility to live in peace like any 
other citizen in the world, and Hamas needs to 
understand it. 
Is it acceptable to Israel for Hamas to remain in 
power in Gaza? 
It is acceptable only in time, only if and when 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
 Hamas accepts the requirements of the international 
community.  
Right now, Hamas didn’t accept, is not willing to 
accept the requirements of the international 
community, is not willing to accept the right of 
Israel to exist. It violates any kind of understandings 
and is using terror against Israeli civilians. So it 
cannot be legitimate and acceptable right now. 
Gregory’s question at lines 1 to 3 has two parts: the first, at line 1, 
introduces the topic of the question, namely ‘Israel’s goal right now’, 
and the second provides specific alternatives that could potentially 
qualify as the answer to the question. The second part of the question is 
of more interest as Gregory is seen to provide two distinct choices of 
actions available to Israel, namely ‘re-establish the cease-fire’ and 
‘invade Gaza and remove Hamas from power’. These choices are 
hearably distinct in that they readily make available specific inferences 
about Israel if it were to act on one rather than the other, and are also 
contradictory in that the former involves actions leading to peace and 
the latter involves violence and aggression. Doing this form of 
questioning then sets up a response that orients to the very aspect of the 
choice and the implications of choosing one rather than the other. 
Livni in her response, at line 4, is seen to orient to the latter part 
of the question and produce a denial of such intentions on the part of 
Israel. Subsequently at lines 4 to 6, Livni presents a similar sort of 
narrative account as seen in Extract 1 regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza 
Strip. This is followed, at lines 6 to 10, by descriptions of current states 
of affairs in Gaza Strip, which present Hamas as an occupying force in 
control of Gaza Strip and attribute hearably negative intentions to 
Hamas, namely ‘to target Israel’. These descriptions are then used to 
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warrant Israel’s current actions against Hamas. In doing that, Livni is 
seen to elide the two options presented by Gregory in his question and 
reformulate Israel’s actions as an ‘answer’ to Hamas’ actions in and from 
Gaza Strip. 
The above response to Gregory’s question has a number of 
similarities with the response in Extract 1. However, what is of interest 
here is Gregory’s uptake of such a response from Livni at lines 11 to 12 
and his subsequent question. Gregory, is seen to reformulate Livni’s 
response into an accusation, that of Israel’s intention to ‘remove Hamas 
from power’. This accusation is seen to be worked up by producing a 
question that involves the use of a redundant address term (Clayman 
2010) – ‘Foreign Minister’ – midway in the interview and, locates the 
source of such a reformulation in Livni’s response – ‘aren’t you making 
the case’. Subsequently at lines 12 to 15, Gregory goes on to produce a 
version of states of affairs that are attributed to Israel. On this account, 
the previously present ‘cease-fire’ is described in highly negative ways – 
‘it simply hasn’t worked’ – and instances of such claims – ‘bombing of 
Sderot and Israel in the southern areas’ – are recruited as evidence for 
the negative evaluation. In doing this, Gregory can be seen to present 
this account as something that could be Israel’s stock response in the 
event that Israel is held accountable This presentation then not only 
serves to count as an accusation on Israel for its intentions to ‘remove 
Hamas from power in Gaza’, but also lays-bare, as it were, the possible 
reasoning behind Israel’s current armed actions against Hamas. By 
including in his question, what could have been Israel’s response, 
Gregory is also seen to index that particular account provided at lines 
12 to 15 as an indication of Israel’s stake (Potter 1996) in the conflict. 
The outcome then is an accusation on Israel presented as grounded in 
commonsensical reasoning. 
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Livni, then, at lines 18 to 20, presents Israel’s current actions as 
being in the service of peace for its own citizens. In doing that, Livni is 
seen to make references to the commonality – ‘live in peace like any 
other citizen in the world’ (lines 19 to 20) – of such intentions and 
actions on the part of a government towards its citizens. Juxtaposing 
such descriptions of Israel’s intentions with descriptions of Hamas, 
serves to present Hamas as an obstacle to what is presented as Israel’s 
normative duty towards its citizens and renders questions on ‘cease-fire’ 
or ‘regime change in Gaza’ seem irrelevant to Israel’s actions. 
Gregory then reformulates his question, at lines 22 to 23, in terms 
of a direct relationship between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. This 
questioning then is different from the prior two questions in that it 
engages specifically with Israel’s intentions on Hamas in Gaza. Livni 
responds, at lines 24 to 26, by shifting the position of ‘principal’ 
(Goffman 1981) for Israel’s intentions on Hamas onto a vaguely 
described ‘international community’. Doing this, allows Livni to 
present Israel as acting in the interests of the ‘international community’ 
rather than for its own interests. However, by providing a description 
of Hamas’ current actions as contravening the wishes of ‘international 
community’ and describing such actions as volitional on the part of 
Hamas, Livni presents Hamas’ rule in Gaza as illegitimate. This allows 
her to make an upshot – ‘it cannot be legitimate and acceptable’ – 
arguing for actions against Hamas’ governance in Gaza. Livni in her 
response then makes use of references to parties external to the conflict 
in ways to manage Israel’s accountability in the Gaza crisis. More 
interestingly, via aligning Israel’s actions in line with the wishes of 
‘international community’, Livni makes the case for continuing armed 
actions against Hamas in Gaza. 
In this extract, Gregory via the use of two contrasting choices of 
action for Israel and by reformulating Livni’s response to his prior 
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question as an accusation, is seen to accomplish making Livni 
accountable for Israel’s actions and intentions. In doing his 
reformulation, Gregory is also seen to treat Livni’s foregoing response 
as an insufficient account of Israel’s actions and intentions towards 
Hamas. Livni’s responses, at lines 4 to 10 and 18 to 21, are seen to 
manage Israel’s accountability by shifting the blame onto Hamas and 
presenting Israel as acting in its national self-interest. By these and via 
aligning Israel with the ‘international community’, Livni is seen to 
argue for continuing armed actions against Hamas.  
 
Extract 3 (CBS: Netanyahu)  
The following extract is from an interview conducted by 
correspondent Jeff Glor on June 15th, 2009 with Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu for CBS news. This particular interview was 
conducted just after the Gaza War was declared to be over. Among 
various other issues, this interview includes discussion on the ‘Peace 
proposal’ made by the then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Glor: 
 
 
 
 
 
Netanyahu: 
 
 
 
 
 
Benjamin Netanyahu is the Prime Minster of 
Israel. Mr. Prime Minster, thanks for joining us. I 
wanna start by talking about this extraordinary 
speech you made yesterday. Are you surprised so 
far at the negative reaction it's received from 
Palestinians and other Arab leaders?  
Well, I'm-- I'm disappointed because-- I took a-- 
a step, not an easy step. And I said, "Here's what 
we are prepared to do for peace. We're prepared 
to have-- a Palestinian state next to a Jewish state." 
And there are two points here. One, that the 
Palestinian state-- recognize the Jewish state just as 
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25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
we're asked to recognize-- the Palestinians. And 
second, that the Palestinian state would be 
demilitarized so that we don't-- experience once 
again the-- the-- hurling of thousands of rockets 
on our cities. And I think this is an equitable 
formula for peace. It's one that enjoys enormous 
unity in the-- in the-- Israeli public and I think-- 
among Israel's friends-- and supporters abroad and 
the supporters of peace abroad. So, yes, I-- I-- I 
supposed I'd like a better response. And maybe it'll 
sink in over time. But I think-- I've opened the 
door for peace. And I hope that the Palestinians 
and the Arab world responds to it.  
Glor, in his question at lines 2 to 4, is seen to orient Netanyahu 
and the audience to one particular issue – ‘this extraordinary speech 
you made yesterday’ – thus foregrounding the topic of the interview. 
Subsequently, at lines 4 to 6, Glor goes on to report responses made to 
such speech by other parties, namely ‘Palestinians and other Arab 
leaders’, and produce a question on Netanyahu’s reactions to those 
responses. It is to be noted that via descriptions such as ‘extraordinary’ 
‘surprised’ and ‘negative’, Glor is seen to treat the speech and the 
incongruous reactions to it as in need of an account. 
Netanyahu in his response, at line 7, can be seen to orient to such 
formulation provided by Glor and report his reaction, in terms of his 
emotional state, as ‘disappointed’. This reporting, however, is treated as 
having a problematic status by displays of hesitation – ‘Well,’ – , and 
false starts – ‘I’m -- I’m’ – preceding such reporting. The problematic 
status of this personal mental state and the nature of his reaction 
reported then allow Netanyahu to provide reasons for his reactions to 
those responses by descriptions of his initiative and a further elaboration 
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of what his initiative consisted in. This is done by reporting his own 
speech, indexed as such via the use of ‘and I said’, from lines 8 to 10. In 
doing that Netanyahu not only reproduces the content of the original 
speech but is seen to provide one specific version of his speech which is 
then used to argue for specific outcomes on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The speech reported here is made in terms of the sorts of 
things that Israel is willing to do – ‘We are prepared to do’, and ‘We’re 
prepared to have’ – which presents Israel as the party taking an 
initiative for peace while also positioning Israel as the agent that retains 
the power or authority to set limits on the sorts of things that go into 
these actions for peace. It is noteworthy, that such efforts at peace are 
presented as a willingness on the part of Israel to accommodate 
Palestine as a sovereign nation as its neighbour. It is this formulation of 
peace – ‘have – a Palestinian state next to a Jewish state’ that is further 
elaborated at lines 11 to 17 as two interrelated items. The first of these 
items, at lines 11 to 13, however is presented as an act of mutual and 
symmetrical recognition on the part of Palestine and Israel. The second 
of these, at lines 13 to 17, however, is seen to include actions – 
‘demilitarized’ – that can be heard as a set of limitations on Palestine. 
This imposition on Palestine is supported by attributing to Palestine a 
dispositional state of initiating acts of aggression – ‘hurling of thousands 
of rockets’. These two items are then summarized as constituting an 
‘equitable formula for peace’ at lines 17 to 18. It is by making a show 
concession in the first item and arguing for a ‘demilitarized’ Palestine in 
the second item, which is accomplished by attributing acts of aggression 
to Palestine, that Netanyahu is seen to present his speech as an initiative 
for peace. This initiative of peace then is presented as a concession on 
the part of Israel to accommodate Palestine as a neighbouring state, 
albeit with restrictions on Palestine’s sovereignty. Then, he goes on to 
recruit support, at lines 18 to 21, for his claims that these items 
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constitute a peace initiative via providing a list of agents – ‘Israeli 
public’, ‘Israel’s friends’, ‘supporters abroad’ and ‘supporters of peace 
abroad’ – that are claimed to be highly supportive of his proposal. In 
doing such a list, Netanyahu is seen to present various groups or agents 
as having common interests (Edwards & Potter 1992) and hence united 
in their efforts for peace. The outcome then is to present ‘Israeli public’ 
and ‘Israel’s friends’ as having similar interests with ‘supporters of peace 
abroad’ and that his speech indeed was an initiative of peace. Having 
done that, Netanyahu, at lines 21 to 22, presents his preference for a 
‘better response’ as a consequence of the positive reactions by other 
parties to, what is presented as an initiative of peace.  
Here, Netanyahu and Glor both treat matters of reactions or 
responses to Netanyahu’s speech as non-trivial. Netanyahu is also seen 
to make use of descriptions of his internal emotive states – 
‘disappointed’ (line 7) and ‘hope’ (line 24) – and preferences – ‘like a 
better response’ (lines 21 to 22) – while discussing matters of inter-
national conflicts (see Edwards & Potter 2005). It is the reporting of 
such states that allows him to report his speech and present it as an 
initiative of peace. Finally, at lines 23 to 25, Netanyahu provides an 
upshot of his own actions – ‘I’ve opened the door for peace’ – and a 
preference for a response from the ‘Palestinians and the Arab world’. 
Doing that serves to provide a gloss over various elements of his speech 
as constituting an attempt at peace and also conversely provides for 
negative inferences on those parties that would either not respond or 
respond in negative ways to such offers at peace. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis provided in this paper is of media news interviews of 
Israeli leaders conducted after the start of the recent Gaza crisis. It is 
readily seen that these interviews are forms of talk that occur in certain 
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ways and we have shown to a limited extent how such features of the 
talk provide various positions for the interviewer and the interviewee 
to effect various social actions. Our focus has been on the ways in 
which, members of the Israeli political leadership are made accountable 
and how these leaders manage such accountability. The findings of the 
analysis can be usefully presented as three interrelated points:  
1)  that accountability is an interactional event;  
2)  accountability is managed through particular narratives and 
descriptions of events and parties; and 
3)  that claims on ‘peace-making’ are closely tied to military 
activities. 
First, accountability can be seen to be an interactional event, in 
that both interviewers and interviewees orient to those aspects of talk 
that make certain actions – Israel’s armed actions against Hamas and 
such – as accountable. For instance, Rodriguez in extract 1 is seen to 
make use of reporting Livni’s speech, and reactions from other parties 
in producing her question. Livni in her response is seen to orient to it 
as an accountable matter and is seen to manage it via descriptions that 
attribute blame for the current conflict to Hamas and its actions. In 
extract 2, Gregory and Livni are seen to go about doing the same 
business, however Gregory is seen to challenge such an account 
provided by Livni and treat is as insufficient and produce another 
question. This indicates that although members treat certain matters as 
accountable and produce accounts to manage such accountability they 
are also seen to negotiate what exactly constitutes as an accountable 
matter and as a sufficient account. In extract 3, Glor treats such matters 
to be accountable via descriptions of Netanyahu’s speech and 
presenting the reactions as incongruous. Netanyahu responds by 
presenting his speech as a peace plan and by recruiting support for his 
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peace plan, while presenting Palestine as the agent of violence in the 
region. 
Secondly throughout these data we see that interviewers and 
interviewees are seen to produce descriptions of Israel, Hamas and 
Palestine in ‘doing’ accountability and managing accountability. The 
interviewers, in extracts 1 and 2, are seen to present Israel’s actions 
and/or intentions as problematic via references to external parties or by 
the use of specific descriptions of Israel’s actions. Livni in both the 
extracts is seen to present Hamas as the aggressor and Israel as a 
‘moderate’ (extract 1) and as doing its normative duty towards its 
citizens (extract 2). Interestingly this is presented as a narrative which 
readily assigns blame to Hamas for the current states of affairs 
(McKenzie 2001).This form of presentation has been identified as a 
common way of justifying one’s own or the representative group’s 
action when called into account (Chang et al 2008; Erjavec & Volcic 
2007). Additionally, Livni is also seen to make references to parties 
external to the conflict, such as ‘the Arab and Muslim worlds’ (extract 
1) and ‘international community’ (extract 2) to argue for a continuation 
of Israel’s current actions. One outcome of doing this then is not only 
to manage Israel’s responsibility in the conflict but also to align Israel 
with other parties thus diffusing the blame for its actions. Members 
then are also seen to make use of parties external to the conflict as a 
resource in managing accountability.  
Thirdly, across the three extracts the interviewees are seen to 
make references to ‘peace’ and present Israel as an agent of peace. In 
extract 1, Livni presents Israel as a ‘moderate’ and in favour of peace in 
the region, while arguing for continual armed actions against Hamas in 
Gaza. Again in extract 2, Livni in responding to an accusation that 
Israel intends to occupy Gaza, presents Israel’s efforts to secure peace 
for its citizens as bound up with engaging Hamas in an armed standoff. 
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And, in extract 3, Netanyahu’s speech is presented as a peace initiative 
that also includes imposing restrictions on Palestine’s military capacities. 
Across these extracts Livni and Netanyahu are seen to present particular 
versions of Israel’s commitments to peace and moderation in ways to 
argue for continuing military actions against Hamas. 
Research in social psychology on issues of racism (Augoustinos, 
Tuffin, & Every 2005; McKenzie 2003), employment {McVittie, 2003 
227 /id;McVittie, 2008 260 /id;Gill, 1993 212 /id} and others has 
shown that members make references to certain principles and notions 
that are readily recognizable as egalitarian, for instance, those of 
freedom and equality to all, in ways to account and justify extant 
practices of discrimination. Similarly, it can be seen that, Livni and 
Netanyahu, in these interviews present Israel as committed to peace, 
moderation and such in ways to argue for extant practices of armed 
actions against Hamas. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, it can be seen that within the media news interviews, 
of the Israeli political elite analysed here, issues of war and associated 
issues of accountability are matters that are made relevant and oriented 
to, that is, are accomplished, within the interaction. Members within 
the interaction then are seen to manage such accountability by making 
use of their commitments to peace as a resource. The implication then 
is that actions such as holding Israel accountable for the Gaza War or 
Israel accusing Hamas of initiating violence in the region or other such 
actions can be made sense of as actions that get done within the 
interaction (Condor 2006). 
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